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Family (Proper) ty 
Richard H. Chused 
J AMILY (PROPER)TY LAW pays remark-ably little attention to the ideal of a marital community. Afraid of the gen-
dered contours of nineteenth century status 
law, contemporary marriage and divorce law 
has become largely contractual. Aspects of 
nineteenth century marriage which might 
prove beneficial, especially to women, have 
been discarded in the rush to adopt a vision of 
marriage as an easily terminable relationship 
between two autonomous souls. In this essay I 
search for a new status vision of marriage that 
recovers non-gendered features of traditional 
family (proper )ty law of value to our present 
culture .. 
I. OLD STORIES OF DEPENDENCY 
There is widespread agreement among histo-
rians that prop!!rty ownership was a defining 
feature of citizenship in the early decades of 
the republic. We all know that property 
ownership was used to limit access to the bal-
lot in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. While the suffrage limitations arose 
in part out of a crass effort by the wealthy to 
control access to the corridors of power, they 
also reflected some important understandings 
about the nature of governance, the capacity of 
individuals to act responsibly, the nature of 
families, and the role of women. 
In a famous letter written to James Sullivan 
in 1776 as he was attending sessions of the 
Continental Congress, John Adams rhetori-
cally asked, "Whence arises the right of the 
majority to govern, and the obligation of the 
minority to obey? From necessity, you will say, 
because there can be no other rule. But why 
exclude women?" His answer was telling, and 
central to even our modern debates over the 
meaning of family (proper)ty. Adams contin-
ued: 
You will say, because their delicacy renders 
them unfit for practice and experience in the 
great businesses of life, and the hardy enter-
prise of war, as well as the arduous cares of 
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state. Besides, their attention is so much en-
gaged with the necessary nurture of their chil-
dren, that nature has made them fittest for 
domestic cares . ... True. But will not these rea-
sons apply to others? Is it not equally true, that 
men in general, in every society, who are 
wholly destitute of property, are also too little 
acquainted with public affairs to form a right 
judgment, and too dependent upon other men 
to have a will of their own? If this is a fact, if 
yo.u give to every man who has no property, a 
vote, will you not make a fine encouraging pro-
vision for corruption, by your fundamental 
law? Such is the frailty of the human heart, 
that very few men who have no property, have 
any judgment of their own. T hey talk and vote 
as some man of property, who has attached 
their minds to his interest, directs them. 
For Adams, property ownership meant · a 
great deal more than wealth. Those of means 
were also independent political, economic and 
social actors. Their wealth meant they were 
capable of acting in the best interests of both 
themselves and the larger society. This view 
was widely shared among those in the found-
ing generations intelligentsia. Left wing politi-
cos took the position that property should be 
distributed broadly among th~ male popula-
tion in order to enlarge the class of electors. 
Those on the right were much more interested 
in protecting their own economic standing. 
But few quarreled with the underlying nexus 
between property ownership and the capacity 
to participate in the exercise of power. 
Men of the founding decades could, of 
course, have taken the position that property 
should be distributed to women as well as 
men. Their failure to consider such a possibil-
ity makes the circular quality of their property 
based definition of citizenship quite palpable. 
Men governed not only the polity, but also the 
family. Women were dependent because they 
had to rely on men. And they couldn't have 
property because they were dependent. But 
regardless of the circles of thought at play, the 
cultural linking of property ownership and in-
dependence established a perspective of enor-
mous and continuing importance. For if 
women were economically dependent upon 
men, then there was no need to 'give" them 
more than a relationship (such as marriage) 
that would meet their survival needs and 
affirm their dependency. But if they became 
independent, then, perhaps, men needed to 
'give" women nothing at all. This dichotomy 
left little room for a family (proper )ty law of 
intimate relationships born of mutual interde· 
pendence rather than economic dependence. 
One either relied upon another person and es· 
chewed the responsibilities of citizenship, or 
became independent and self-reliant. 
While notions of dependency changed 
some over the ensuing generations, the basic 
dichotomy established by Adams' rhetoric 
remained quite influential. The tight links 
between property, civic responsibility and suf· 
frage gradually loosened over the course of the 
nineteenth century, but those with property 
were still thought of as more capable of inde· 
pendent action. By the middle of the nine· 
teenth century, wage earners came to be seen as 
capable of exercising independent thought and 
therefore of voting. For a short time after the 
Civil War, freed slaves were thought capable of 
contracting for their labor and therefore of ex· 
ercising suffrage. But both working men and 
the freed slaves eventually got hung up on the 
same sort of dilemma that faced women. If you 
were truly independent citizens, there was no 
need to ask the government or anyone else in a 
position of authority for economic assistance. 
Unions, for example, were surely not necessary 
for independent wage earners; nor were pro· 
tective labor laws. And African Americans, af· 
ter a brief post-Civil War window of political 
opportunity, were placed below womens ped-
estal, deemed incapable of political action be· 
cause they were dependent souls and 
dependent because they were thought inher· 
ently incapable of political action. 
While the worldview of Adams and others 
of his generation encompassed a tight fit be· 
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tween property ownership, independence, 
thoughtful exercise of civic responsibility, con-
trol of families and political participation, it 
also nurtured two sorts of understandings 
about shared goals, one among men, and the 
other between men and women. Those men 
With property, at least to some extent, would 
work together to protect their common inter-
ests. Though the constitutional framework 
was designed to reduce the likelihood that any 
particular interest group would dominate gov-
ernmental decision making, there was still a 
widely held assumption that the civic respon-
sibility accompanying ownership of property 
and the right to exercise political and familial 
authority would further a commm~, male 
enterprise. 
Marriage was also a pivotal common enter-
prise. While middle and upper class women 
were dependent and therefore incapable of in-
dependent participation in the government or 
economy, they had important political and so-
cial roles. Politically they took charge of civic 
education, preparing boy children for partici-
pation in the body politic and girl children to 
tnarry and educate their children. Socially 
they were the intimate partners of men. As the 
nineteenth ce~tury passed, and many men 
Went off to work outside the home, middle 
and upper class women came to serve addi-
tional social functions - taking care of the kids 
and maintaining a household. Though defined 
in a seriously imbalanced way, the dependency 
of women involved an exchange of economic 
support in return for their unpaid work in the 
home and the legitimization of an intimate 
relationship. 
Without the help of women at home, mid-
dle and upper class men could not have 
Worked in the burgeoning commercial and in-
dustrial economy that grew on these shores in 
the last century. There was a cultural mythol-
ogy, if not an economic reality, that married 
Women were guaranteed economic security 
and cultural respect in return for their accep-
tance of dependent roles. Part of that eco-
nomic security and cultural respect was buried 
in alimony rules, which provided access to 
funds after divorce to women who "behaved" 
over the course of a long marriage with 
moneyed ;gentlemen." As the centrality of this 
dependency arrangement to American culture 
declined in this century, so too did the idea ali-
mony was due to women who fulfilled their 
marital obligations in traditional ways. 
Altering this structure of dependency rela-
tionships between married men and women 
has been a slow and often painful process. 
Beginning about one -hundred and sixty years 
ago with the adoption of the first married 
womens property acts, women gradually ob-
tained the same legal rights to ownership of 
property as men. Wage ownership of a limited 
sort arrived in most jurisdictions after the 
Civil War. Women obtained suffrage after 
World War I. Marital property rules emerged 
with divorce reform during the last twenty-five 
years. 
While claims by radical women for rights to 
property ownership and control were certainly 
heard during each era of reform, legislators 
usually acted for quite conservative and tradi-
tional reasons. Radical women often made 
claims for rights with rhetoric of autonomy, in 
essence accepting the independent/ dependent 
dichotomy established by John Adams and his 
peers during the founding decades of the re-
public. Such radical claims rarely carried the 
day. Married women's property acts arrived 
not as a recognition of the right of wives to 
own and control property and therefore to 
become independent economic and political 
actors, but as debtor protection devices to al-
low 'property held by married women to escape 
the clutches of husbandly creditors. Increasing 
family stability was the goal, not wifely inde-
pendence. Wage statutes adopted after the 
Civil War accepted the right of women to sue 
for their wages, but did so in recognition of the 
need of many women to enter the work force to 
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support their families. And the statutes did lit-
tle to alter the right of husbands to control the 
family accounts after their wives' wages were 
brought home. These statues, like the married 
women's property acts, were thought to solid-
ify the home economy, not recognize the inde-
pendent status of women outside the family. 
Even suffrage, that touchstone of early republi-
can notions of civic responsibility, was granted 
with an understanding that womens higher 
moral antennae could control the excesses of 
men, especially drinking men, thereby preserv-
ing the sanctity of the home. 
Despite the conservative political rhetoric 
surrounding each burst of reform, many 
women actually used the changes to enlarge 
their own realms of economic and, eventually, 
political power. Though change arrived amid 
traditional talk about dependent women serv-
ing the needs of their families by holding prop-
erty, earning wages and voting for temperance, 
it created openings for women to lay claim to 
spheres of independent economic and political 
action. Women owned more property in 1900 
than in 1800; certain sorts of employment 
opportunities, including limited access to the 
legal profession, began to open after the Civil 
War; women began to appear as writers, edu-
cators, athletes, legislators, judges, and doctors. 
These events did not go unnoticed by pre-New 
Deal conservatives on the Supreme Court. In a 
remarkable opinion full of puffing about the 
new found independence of women created by 
law reform and the arrival of suffrage, the 
Court, in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, struck 
down minimum wage laws for women. They 
theorized that women were just as capable of 
independently agreeing to contracts for their 
labor as their male peers in Lochner v. New York 
and that minimum wage laws must therefore 
fall as a violation of freedom of contract. The 
case is a perfect example of how women's claim 
for independence was used to refuse them 
benefits previously granted under traditional 
theories rooted in riotions of dependency. 
This background is crucial to understand-
ing the contemporary debate about the mean-
ing and proper scope of marital property law. 
Though women are frequently dependent on 
their husbands in ways much like their sisters 
a century ago, the widespread claims for mari-
tal autonomy in modern culture have reduced, 
if not eliminated, the sway of nineteenth cen-
tury visions of marriage. Indeed, the old vision 
of marriage is now viewed as so thoroughly 
discredited by its ideal of female dependency 
that many insist it may not be used as a solid 
basis for thoughtful analysis. We have even 
tossed out the old labels, calling alimony spou-
sal support and reviling the word "status" as a 
wholly inappropriate label for the state of 
marriage. As marital autonomy has risen, the 
ability to rely upon marriage as a source of 
economic, social and cultural security has 
eroded. 
It is time to think anew about the values 
and meanings of nineteenth century marriage. 
I suggest that the nineteenth century vision of 
marriage should not be completely discarded. 
While the harshly gendered quality of tradi-
tional marital property rules and the jarring 
dependence of married women in the last cen-
tury is now unacceptable, three of traditional 
marriage's basic components - the expectation 
of marital longevity, the idea of an exchange of 
valuable assets, and the importance of inti-
macy - must be retained if marriage is to have 
meaning and stable environments for children 
are to flourish. 
II. NEW STORIES OF 
IN(DEPENDENCY) 
Treating people as economically independent 
after they divorce does ·not always mesh with 
the reality of dependence that continues to ex· 
ist in many marriages. One day it may come to 
pass that women do not expend parJ of their 
economic potential on their husbaqds and 
families. But at least for now, it is clear that 
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tnany more wives than husbands do not work, 
Work fewer hours, postpone their careers or 
tnake other decisions which lower their long 
term income earning potential. There is still a 
Web of inter-dependency (perhaps not quite so 
one-sided as a century ago) that makes both 
tnarriage and divorce a much more serious 
economic step for women than for men, even 
tnaking the unwarranted assumption that the 
culture of work no lo~ger discriminates 
against women. To the extent that we refuse to 
Use these ongoing indicia of marital reliance as 
a basis for allocating resources, we exacerbate 
the impoverishment of women, and not sur-
prisingly, of the children they are likely to 
keep. . 
In the future, it may be that gender will be-
come an unimportant sign ofdependence in 
tnarriage. Men may sometimes be as depen-
dent upon women as women now are upon 
tnen. Many marriages may not be economi-
cally unbalanced. Each partner may rely upon 
their mate in a variety of ways that are impos-
sible to untangle. The lessening of genders 
significance, however, should not lead us to ig-
nore the reality that even in a gender-neutral 
family law world, interdependencies will 
always develop between partners in intimate 
relationships. Qur tendency to describe mar-
riage as a "union" of two autonomous actors 
and divorce as a claim for independence and a 
clean break, undermines our willingness to 
rely on interconnections between .spouses. 
Our refusal to take seriously the en.twined in-
timacy of marital relationships also makes it 
easy to ignore new forms of reliance emerging 
between unmarried cohabitants. · 
Marital property law largely ignores both 
the continuing presence of (often gendered) 
dependencies analogous to those of a century 
ago, and the importance of the entwined inti-
lllacy that always exists in families that func-
tion well. Though contemporary marital 
Property law often invokes words like 
"partnership" or "community," the discussion 
is more like that accompanying analysis of 
business deals than family arrangements. 
There is little partnership or property talk 
that links people together in ways that 
connote longevity, economic exchange and in-
timacy. Marital and community property 
schemes al~ow parties to sign pre-nuptial con-
tracts that alter or destroy expectations of 
sharing during or after marriage. Those not 
signing contracts may retain the separate 
property they owned before marriage by 
declining to share it with their spouses. And 
divorce law calls for dividing the capital ac-
count of a !'Ilarriage at divorce, leaving the · 
spouses largely independent of one another af-
ter the divorce is complete. 
The language of partnership and commu-
nity is therefore quite different from the no-
tion of marital partnership that was used a 
century ago. That old and discredited partner-
ship of dependency involved connotations of 
marital longevity, economic exchanges and ob-
ligations extending beyond the marriage that 
are now seriously contested, if not reviled. 
Putting aside the issue of children, marriage is 
now thought of as a relationship between two 
autonomous persons and divorce as a clean 
break rather than a gradual dissolution of a 
community. Alimony is a road to indepen-
dence rather than an indicia of long term en-
twined intimacy. Modern marital and 
community property law therefore legitimates 
claims of independence as marriage begins, 
endures and ends, rather than affirming the 
marital community as a basis for discussing 
the nature of intimacy, interdependence and 
family. As far as property law is concerned, 
marriage is a financial arrangement pure and 
simple, not an important cultural institution. 
Adams' vision of independent actors has 
moved from the world of politics to the still 
gendered realm of the family. 
The courts most often confront marriage 
when it ends. Without thinking about why 
parties marry or why they divorce, judges are 
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asked to wind up the financial affairs of a bro-
ken family. They draw a sharp line between 
the capital account of a marriage, representing 
the accumulations of the community about to 
be terminated, and the future income earning 
potential of the spouses. This division flies in 
the face of much that was once traditional 
about marriage. Women were dependent 
upon their husbands' income streams during 
marriage, and, most importantly for our pur-
poses, husbands relied upon their wives' home 
labor to make their careers possible. Divorce 
was unusual. There was therefore legitimacy 
to the claim made by married women that 
they should be able to rely upon their hus-
bands' income stream. Even after divorce, ali-
mony was sometimes awarded in recognition 
of the right of women to rely upon their mates' 
stream of income during their adult lives. 
After all, wives had made that income stream 
possible. As acceptance of the idea that 
women make men's income possible has 
waned, so has our willingness to reassign fu-
ture income from a wealthier ex-spouse to a 
less wealthy ex-spouse. Claims of indepen-
dence and the clean break associated with di-
vorce now overwhelm any thought that the 
entwined intimacy of marriage should have 
economic consequences or that the presence 
of marital economic dependency by members 
of either gender justifies the need for an 
ongoing financial relationship between ex-
spouses. 
The notions that marriage is a contract 
between autonomous individuals and that 
divorce is a clean break requiring the termi-
nation of economic connections between 
spouses has made marriage a secondary social 
institution. Oxymcronic claims of"marital au-
tonomy" and judicial affirmations of the clean 
break syndrome have rendered marriage less 
interesting, attractive, and important. If one 
can contract around its primary property con-
straints, why take it seriously? If it can be 
easily ended, why begin it? I( it has no prop-
erty connotations that bind people together in 
special ways, why respect it? Integral to the 
discredited nineteenth century marriage was 
the notion that entry into the marital state was 
a big step, a very big step indeed. It was a life 
change of major import. In the process of re-
jecting old status concepts of marriage we have 
discarded the cultural expectations that made 
the ·institution important. We have thrown 
away the baby with the bath water. We have 
not only cut the links between inte.r( depen-
dency) and marriage, but also the interconnec-
tions between the contours of divorce law and 
social conceptions about the importance of 
entry into marriage. We can no longer afford 
to treat these two inquiries - the law of mar-
riage and the law of divorce - as disconnected 
enterprises. 
All ·of tnis makes quite questionable the 
bright lines we presently tend to draw at di-
vorce between separate and marital or com-
munity property, and between future income 
and marital capital. It also undercuts the valid-
ity of the old dichotomy we tend to draw be-
tween dependent spouses and independent, 
unmarried, divorced people, as well as the 
newer dichotomy between married and un-
married couples. These issues all involve as-
pects of the same questions. To what extent 
should the existence of economic interdepen-
dence and of entwined intimacy that is so 
much a part of marriage be used as a basis for 
meshing the financial affairs of intimate cou-
ples? Should the property connections that ex-
ist between spouses or other intimate couples 
have life after the relationships end? If our the-
ory of partnership or community as a basis for 
marriage means anything, why should it be 
waivable by contract and terminable at the 
drop of a divorce hat? Why not think of mar-
riage, divorce and the property relationships 
they entail as part of a process of changing the 
lives of two people, much as we now-think of 
both birth and death as gradual events that re-
quire rules to change over time as events 
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unfold. And why should unmarried people 
who have relationships that are indistinguish-
able from married couples be treated any 
differently? 
Thinking about marriage and divorce. as a 
process that occurs over time would dramati-
cally alter our present understanding of many 
rnarital property cases now commonly used in 
first year property courses in law schools and 
bandied about in the literature of the practic-
ing family law bar. Rather than posing ques-
tions about the division of capital and income, 
they become inquiries into the appropriate 
Ways to entangle and then disentangle people 
in a relationship. The graduate degree as prop-
erty cases that so dominate discussion of the 
lines to be drawn between marital capital and 
future income are actually symbolic of much 
larger questions. They are not about invest-
rnent, capital and income in a particular 
Project so much as they are about the appro-
priate ways to entangle people in marriage and 
disentangle them after divorce. That more 
general inquiry means that any source of past, 
Present or future income, not just that pro-
duced by one spouse's investment in the grad-
uate 4egree of another, should become a 
subject of inquiry in the law of marriage and 
divorce. In sh<m, there is nothing special 
about a degree. What is important is not the 
degree but the search for a basis for allocating 
the potential economic value - past, present 
and future - of those in a marital partnership. 
Indeed, it may, in the modern sense, be civi-
cally responsible to consider ways to forge 
links between married people, rather than to 
affirm their quick access to independence. 
III. STATUS AND MARITAL 
PROPERTY 
llroperty thinkers, schooled on economic the-
ories and principles of rational acting, reliant 
Upon autonomy as the backbone of their intel-
lectual culture, unconcerned about the way the 
legal culture of marital property has helped 
create the clean break, and totally unaware of 
the possibility that the cultural qualities of 
marriage might change if the property rules at 
divorce shifted, don't like to think about the 
way property law and status law interact. It 
would be useful if everyone who writes about 
or teaches property taught family law for a few 
years. The romantic idea of marriage as some-
thing more than a sum of its two parts, if 
taken with just a smidgen of seriousness, 
makes our present laws of marital property 
woefully inadequate. And the need to talk 
about children quickly reduces the relevance 
of autonomy, ration~ acting and indepen-
dence as driving forces for legal norms. 
What would it mean for family (prop~r )ty 
law if we took seriously the central non-
gendered aspects of nineteenth century mar-
riage - the expectation of marital longevity, 
the exchange of assets, and the value of 
entwined intimacy? First, fault divorce should 
not be re-instituted. S~cond, the rules of 
marriage should be altered so that many more 
intimate relationships are treated as marital. 
Family formation and marriage, now thought 
of separately, ought to be treated as closely re-
lated events. Third, the law of marriage and 
the law of divorce should not be thought of as 
separate inquiries. As a result, the economic 
interdependence of married people ought to 
be significantly enlarged by eliminating the 
concept of separate property, doing away with 
the differences between marital and commu-
nity property regimes, and requiring post-
marital sharing of income after divorce for a 
significant period of time. Fourth, children 
ought to be considered as economic parties to 
a marriage, entitled at divorce to shares of the 
marit_al or community property along with 
their parents. In combination these steps 
would dramatically increase the number of in-
timate settings in which marriage would occur 
while significantly increasing the economic 
consequences of marriage. Over the course of 
G R E E N B A G • Winter 1998 127 
Richard H. Chused 
time, the result would be to persuade people 
to more carefully and maturely consider the 
initiation, mainte~ance and termination of 
intimate relationships. 
At first glance you might assume that rein-
vigorating portions of a nineteenth century vi-
sion of marriage would require the repeal of 
no-fault divorce. That is wrong. Fault divorce 
law was heavily laden with currents of reli-
gious thought from English traditions and de-
signed to enforce the dependent/independent 
dichotomy of the last century. Recognition of 
a need in present day society for family stabil-
ity does not mean that it should be sought in 
the same ways that were used a century ago. 
Indeed, the main thesis of this essay is that 
family (proper )ty law may be structured to 
foster such stability without returning to the 
gendered dependent/independent dichotomy 
of the past. 
Furthermore, divorce law is a terribly in-
efficient way to deal with marital instability. 
The fault divorce structure was an after-the-
fact system designed to punish and deter mar-
ital wrongdoing by refusing to allow parties to 
sever their family ties. The sheer perversity of 
using continuation of a broken marriage as a 
device to punish misbehavior created unfair-
ness and generated enormous disrespect for 
legal institutions. It led to false pleading, 
feigned cases, migratory divorce, and nasty lit-
igation. Society would be much better served 
by creating incentives for appropriate behavior 
from the day marriages begin rather than pun-
ishing mal~factors after the fact. Though the 
horrors of tH~ fault divorce system, together 
with strong customs constraining divorce, 
probably did 'rrieah that many nineteenth cen-
tury couples attempted to carefully select their 
mates and 'acted ·with care before divorcing, 
similar dioughtfulness can be encouraged 
without returning to perverse divorce princi-
ples. Lohgevity of marriage may be encour-
aged by dramatically increasing the number of 
relationships we label as marital, requiring 
substantial exchanges of wealth between par-
ties upon marriage, holding people to eco-
nomic obligations after divorce, and 
introducing the idea that children are part of 
the economic community of marriage. 
The law of marriage ought to be changed to 
pronounce many more people married than it 
does. today. The idea is to make the establish-
ment of an intimate relationship much closer 
to a decision to marry than at present. If the 
legal consequences attached to the initiation of 
intimacy were significant and broad in scope, 
people would be more likely to exercise some 
care in initiating such a relationship. In addi-
tion to continuing to validate standard con-
sensual marriages, marriage should be deemed 
to occur automatically whenever a child is 
born to a couple and whenever an intimate re-
lationship lasts for more than two years with· 
out the birth of a child. The goal is to make 
sure that the entwined economic and emo· 
tional expectations of relationships are always 
treated as legally important. Two years is an 
arbitrary construct. If you prefer one year, 
that's fine. (This is not an essay on sexual ori· 
entation. I do not care about the gender of the 
parties coupling up. Nor is this an essay about 
new birthing technology. For purposes of this 
essay, I also do not care about how a child is 
created. And finally, this is not an essay about 
defining parent. Though I usually prefer to 
think in terms of psychological parenting in 
settings involving new reproductive tech-
niques, that conclusion is not central to the 
themes of this essay.) You could think of this 
proposal as a new form of 'common law" 
marriage. 
In addition to dramatically increasing the 
number of relationships that we call marital, 
the economic consequences of marriage must 
be substantially increased. The concept of sep· 
arate property ought be abolished. Al! prop· 
erty belonging to persons on the date they 
marry, regardless of its source, should be 
treated as marital or community property, 
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subject to division at divorce, unless it is 
bound by the constraints of a prior divorce de-
cree. We should rid ourselves of the widely ac-
cepted rules that property owned prior to 
marriage or received during marriage by way 
?f gift or inheritance is separate property. 
Such a change would dramatically increase the 
financial stakes of marriage. Combined with 
the new 'common law" marriage rules, people 
With money would be compelled to carefully 
consider the consequences of having a child or 
initiating and maintaining a long-term rela-
tionship. Those without money would also be 
effected, though in different ways. To what-
ever degree the significant changes in marriage 
law discussed here would alter general cultural 
understandings about the nature of intimacy, 
all social groups would eventually be 
influenced. 
In order for this system to have the in-
tended effect, ante-nuptial contracts and other 
devices used to place significant limitations on 
the sharing of marital assets must be abol-
ished. Increasing the economic consequences 
of divorce as recommended here would make 
ante-nuptial contracts even more attractive to 
the well-off. The need to alter cultural under-
standings about•the meaning and seriousness 
of marriage, however, suggests that persons 
should not be allowed to avoid the conse-
quences of marriage by protecting themselves 
from the economic consequences of divorce. 
The present trend to think of marriage as con-
tractual, along with the clean break syndrome 
now governing operation of the divorce sys-
tem, means that the economically less well off 
spouse (usually a woman) has little leverage at 
any stage of a marital relationship. That out-
come reduces the meaning of marriage as an 
interdependent partnership and legitimates an 
Unequal balance of power in marriage. Second 
marriages ought to be completely subject to 
the economic allocations made after a prior 
divorce. 
Similarly, post-divorce mcome streams, 
now excluded from consideration at divorce 
except when payment of spousal support is or-
dered, also should be treated as marital or 
community property for a substantial period 
of time after the divorce. Income splitting be-
tween the tnarital partners should continue 
for one year for each two years of marriage. 
(Children, as the second paragraph below ar-
gues, also should be included in the sharing, 
though on a different time frame.) This pro-
posal, like the proposal to declare two-year 
intimate relationships as marital, is arbitrary. 
If you prefer a different time structure, I 
would not be strongly opposed. 
The recommendations to rid ourselves of 
the concept of separate property, ban ante-
nuptial contracts, and institute serious post-
marital income sharing require a substantial 
restructuring of marital property law. Their 
adoption would undermine any reason, as-
suming there is one, to maintain both com-
mon law and community property regimes. 
The most important area of difference be-
tween the two systems arises at death. With 
some exceptions, disposition at death follows · 
title in common law property states, while 
community property is split between the 
spouses at the death of one. This difference 
should disappear if serious marital sharing, in-
cluding mandatory non-waivable sharing of 
the estates of married people, is instituted. If 
sharing becomes the norm, the two regimes 
would, for all practical purposes, become one. 
Finally, children should be treated as eco-
nomic parties to the marital community. 
Upon divorce they should be entitled to a pro-
portionate share of both the marital economic 
community and the parents' future income 
streams until they reach the age of 22, or if stu-
dents, complete college. The goal is to inte-
grate children into the legal and cultural 
concept of a family until . they are capable of 
supporting themselves. Integrating children 
into the marital community would also re-
move the need to draft ante-nuptial contracts 
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to protect the children of first marriages when 
their parents remarry. The present structure, 
which considers children as entitled to sup-
port, but not as equal interdependent partners 
in the economic community of marriage, is 
symptomatic of our present family (proper )ty 
law malaise. Though the recent arrival of child 
support guidelines is a significant improve-
ment over prior practice, children are still con-
ceptualized as individuals entitled to money, 
not as integral parts of a family entitled to a 
full share of the marital economic community. 
There is no reason to continue along that 
path. 
In sum, the recommendations outlined 
here create a new system of marriage that dra-
matically increases the proportion of intimate 
relationships deemed marital and significantly 
enlarges the economic entanglements of mar-
riage partners. They demonstrate the poten-
tial for both reshaping marital communities 
without recourse to the gendered assumptions 
of nineteenth century family (proper)ty l~w 
and creating strong incentives for carefully 
considering the initiation of intimate relation-
ships. In the long run, society would be better 
off if we were all asked to think of marriage as 
a significant event designed to create stable en-
vironments for adults and children. We can no 
longer afford to countenance childbirth as a 
largely inconsequential family (proper )ty law 
event and marriage as a contractual scheme 
with few if any mandatory, long term conse-
quences. O i:_r grandchildren deserve better. f1 
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